Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two considerations motivated the selection of these nations for investigation. First, working-class economic and political organizations, have on the whole been free of direct repression in these societies since World War II, and patterns of labor-management confrontation can therefore be meaningfully compared. Second, reliable data on socioeconomic and political variables necessary for the empirical evaluation of theoretical arguments are available for each of these countries during most of the postwar period.
The main body of the paper has three principal parts. The first section deals with issues of strike measurement and introduces a threedimensional characterization of strike activity which forms the basis of subsequent statistical analyses. The next section examines trends in industrial conflict in the postwar period and is designed to dispose of the argument that strike activity and labor militancy are "withering away" in advanced industrial societies. The third and most important part of the study develops a number of theoretically plausible statistical models to explain short-term fluctuations in the volume of strikes. The models investigated in this section incorporate a variety of economic and political factors that are commonly believed to influence strike activity. The economic factors include (1) movements in real wages, which are given an expectation-achievement theoretical rationalization; (2) the demand for labor, as indexed by the unemployment rate; and (3) changes in the ratio of aggregate profits to total employee compensation, that is, changes in the relative share of labor vs. capital in the national income. Among the most important political influences evaluated in these models are (1) the incentive of labor-oriented Socialist parties to discourage strike activity on the part of their working-class constituencies, which is posited to be a function of the competitive position of labor-Socialist parties in the political system; and (2) the relative size of Communist parties, which are viewed as significant agencies for the mobilization of labor discontent. A fourth and concluding section of the paper reviews the evidence concerning the impact of economic and political factors on fluctuations in industrial conflict and develops some implications of the statis-Each of these dimensions is suitable for crosstime, cross-country analysis; however, it is advantageous to array them into a three-dimensional solid or cuboid that represents the profile or "shape" of strikes in a particular nation during a particular time-period. to describe nineteenth and early twentieth century strikes in many industrial nations. The typical strike during this initial stage of industrialization was comparatively small in size (few strikers per strike) reflecting the small scale of early establishments; of long duration (many man-days lost per striker) evidencing the bitter, protracted resistance that newly-formed unions encountered from employers; and relatively low in frequency (few strikes per 1000 workers), indicating the rather weak organization and mobilization of the labor force. Figure 1 (b) represents a "modern" strike profile which Shorter and Tilly suggest was more common in the mid-twentieth century. It shows a vastly increased average strike size which was in part produced by the consolidation of industrial establishments, somewhat higher frequency corresponding to the heightened mobilization and organization of the working class, and markedly reduced duration. Hence what might be called the "trench warfare" pattern of infrequent, long, but relatively small strikes that typified disputes between capital and newly organized labor in the nineteenth century seems to have been supplanted by a "guerrilla warfare" pattern of frequent, short, and relatively large "lightning" strikes in more recent decades.
Aside from the structural changes that undoubtedly contributed to this historical evolution of strike profiles (growth in firm size, the extension of labor organization, and so on), there appears to be a rational basis for labor's abandoning the trench warfare pattern of Figure  1 (a) in favor of the guerrilla warfare approach in strike profiles may partly reflect a workingclass learning process informed by the historical experience ot labor-capital struggles.
Contemporary cross-national patterns provide some additional evidence that rational workingclass behavior may underlie observed differences in aggregate strike shapes. For example, in France and Italy where the most important unions are essentially Leninist organizations with relatively small memberships and slender financial resources, the guerrilla warfare strike profile of FigVre 1(b) is pronounced. Organized labor in these nations could not well withstand long sieges or tests of strength against management and therefore the relatively large, brief, and frequent "lightning" strike prevails.5 The strike profiles of the United States and Canada, on the other hand, more nearly resemble the trench warfare pattern of Figure 1 (a). Unions in these countries have large dues-paying memberships and as a result command the substantial strike funds necesary to engage in comparatively long trials of strength against management.
Although comparative time-series analysis of strike profiles is a potentially useful line of inquiry, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop statistical models explaining short-run postwar fluctuations in overall strike magnitudes. What we need is a single series that captures the net "damage" or impact of strikes. Perhaps the most suitable index of overall strike activity is the volume of the three-dimensional strike profile. The volume of any cuboid is of course the product of its three dimensions. Accordingly we calculate a quantity akin to the physical concept of volume: 5The contrast between the traditional, war-of-attrition strike familiar to most Americans and the guerrilla warfare strategy described in the text is put into even sharper focus by the description of the latter pattern given by Blumenfeld: "Italian unions, which have no strike funds, have developed a whole range of disruptive activities. Among these are the 'chessboard' strike, involving only selected departments; the 'paybook' strike, in which every worker whose paycard carries an odd number engages in disputes on odd days of the week, while workers with even numbers fight out their claims on the even days; and strikes in which bluecollar workers lay down their tools in the morning but return to work after lunch, only to find that the whitecollar clerks are out -thus stopping work for an entire day with the loss of only a half a day ' Perhaps the most influential comparative investigation of strike activity is Ross and Hartman's Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (1960). One of the principal conclusions of this study is that industrial conflict has (with few exceptions) virtually "withered away" in advanced industrial societies. Ross and Hartman attribute this decline in strike activity to changes in employer policies, dispute-settlement techniques, governmental functions, and union programs, as well as to the persistence of full employment, the decline of ideology and class bitterness, the improvement of living standards and embourgeoisement of the working class, and to the enormous growth in white collar, professional and service class employment that has accompanied the shift from industrial to "postindustrial" socioeconomic formations.
Man
The following section evaluates a number of these propositions more formallyhere we focus directly on the "withering away" thesis. Ross and Hartman construct a large number of strike indices in the course of their analysis, but unfortunately the withering away argument depends heavily on only two measures: man-days lost per union member ("Membership Loss Ratio") and man-days lost per striker ("Duration"). The former ratio is a particularly weak index from which to draw general conclusions about the time path of in-409-426. Sartori provides an interesting, although exaggerated, assessment of the leverage that "guerrilla warfare" strike strategies (known as scioperi articolati in Italy and dc~brayages or groves tournantes in France) gives labor in service-dependent, "postindustrial" societies. See Giovanni Sartori," "II Potere Del Lavoro Nella Societa Post-Pacificata," Revista Italiana Di Scienza Politica, ANNO III (Aprile 1973), 31-81. dustrial conflict. For some countries union membership data are notoriously inaccurate (e.g., France and Italy), and the meaning of unionization differs so greatly across nations that international comparison of a union membership ratio is highly suspect. More important, the general temporal decline Ross and Hartman observe in man-days lost per union member is at least in part an artifact of the union membership rate of growth exceeding that of the total wage and salary labor force during the period of massive labor mobilization treated by their study .
In other words, if union membership was growing with respect to time more rapidly than the total wage and salary labor force, then it is possible for man-days lost per union member to exhibit a downward time trend, while man-days lost per worker was holding steady or even increasing through time. Indeed, the data series reported by Ross and Hartman in the appendices of their study indicate this was true in many industrial societies.
Decreases over time in the second index, man-days lost per striker (duration), are of course not artificial, but do not necessarily imply a declining strike volume, as the reduction in strike duration but not overall strike volume between Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrates. The most direct way to evaluate the secular evolution of aggregate strike activity is to examine the volume of strikes over time. The level of unemployment is perhaps the most sensitive indicator of general business conditions (countercyclical), and it is natural to expect working-class militancy to vary inversely with it. Low unemployment offers great strategic advantages to an aggressive labor force. A tight labor market means that management will have difficulty replacing potential strikers, who in any case can anticipate good prospects for securing permanent employment elsewhere if employers are able to replace them successfully. Opportunities for temporary or part-time employment during the course of a strike are also likely to be good. The situation is reversed when unemployment is high and there is an excess supply of labor. Strike-breakers are more easily recruited by employers and alternative job opportunities for strikers are reduced.9 Faced 9 It is not really necessary that employers actually replace strikers with great regularity -it is the psychological threat that is important, and this is heightened during periods of high unemployment. with decreased product demand, capital is unlikely to be affected adversely by a prolonged work stoppage, and may even welcome an interruption of production in a period of receding profits and excessive inventories.10 Hence, potential strikers are more vulnerable and militancy is discouraged. Letting SV and U denote strike volume and the level of unemployment, respectively, we therefore would expect aSVt/aUt <. The effect of profits on strikes is more problematic. From the perspective of working class aggressiveness, the relevant quantity is returns to capital as a ratio of returns to labor, that is, Aggregate Business Profits/Total Employee Compensation. It seems reasonable to assume that when the profit ratio is increasing, workers will escalate their demands and press them more militantly. Other things being equal, this should produce an upward movement in the volume of strikes. However, management is more likely to yield to labor demands in such situations because of the severe opportunity costs of absorbing a strike when markets are expanding and profits are potentially high. As Hicks put it in his classic The Theory of Wages, ". . . when trade is good, the cost of a strike to the employers will be immensely enhanced. Once an employer is making large profits, and expects those profits to continue in the near future, he is an easy mark for union demands. He will nearly always be prepared to make some concession in order to avoid a strike."" The nct impact of changes in profits on strike activity is therefore uncertain. Letting AC denote the rate of change of the profit ratio, we have )SVt/az\Ct 5O.
My specification of the influence of real in sharp contrast to the labor scene of recent years (i.e., when unemployment was low), both union and corporate officials agree. Not long ago, they say, rank-and- wages'2 on industrial conflict is based on expectation-achievement theory. The thrust of the theory is that aggressive, violent, or protest behavior is caused in part by a gap between expectation and achievement. Variants of the theory have appeared in all branches of social science. For example, writing of civil violence, Gurr observes: "The fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation-induced discontent: the greater the discrepancy between what men believe they deserve and what they think they are capable of attaining, the greater their discontent. The more intense and widespread discontents are in society, the more intense and widespread strife is likely to be.""3 Similarly, James Davies has argued that collective disorder ". . . is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickenly widens and becomes intolerable."14 In a statement of the theory closer to the topic of this study, the psychologists Krech and Crutchfield have written: "A wage rate is psychologically inadequate, no matter how large in absolute amount, if it results in a wide discrepancy between the worker's level of aspiration and his level of achievement."' Although expectation-achievement theory has not received consistent support from empirical studies and tends to understate or ignore altogether the importance of structural factors for conflict behavior, the basic thesis provides a plausible theoretical framework within which to specify the impact of real wage movements on strike activity. Since labor-management conflict 12 "Real" wages refer of course to money wages deflated for price increases, that is, R = W/P where R, W, and P denote real wages, money wages, and a price index, respectively. A following section deals with the "money illusion" thesis that labor militancy responds to money wage increases alone. (6) The lag functions determining the behavior of (1 3)-(16) are likely to have the following properties. The weighted average of real wage changes defining AR' ("recent experience") will depend heavily on the outcomes of the latest periods, perhaps peaking after a few lags, and the experience of more distant periods will be rapidly discounted. Hence the ai coefficients forming AR' should be governed by a low-order polynomial lag distribution with a steep rate of decay. In contrast, it is reasonable to anticipate the moving average component of long-run real wage expectations (AR*) to be weighted more equally by current and past experience, which implies a linear or quasigeometric lag distribution with a relatively slow rate of -decay in the 4i. The difference of these lag functions (pIA is therefore likely to exhibit an inverted U-shaped distribution, which is conveniently estimated by the polynomial distributed lag method of Shirley Almon.21
To sum up at midstream, the discussion thus far has developed three plausible models specifying the impact of unemployment, business profits, and real wage changes on the volume of strikes: where AR=the percentage rate of change of real wages, Ut = the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed, and ACt = the rate of change of aggregate profits/total employee compensation. . is necessarily embedded within the nation-specific intercepts of (1 7c,) and therefore is effectively "lost" for inferential purposes (i.e., these parameters are underidentified).
fluctuations in strike activity in the presence of a location parameter or ignorance term that varies across countries.
The estimates for (17a) and (17b) in Table 1 Despite great efforts to maximize the success of these models, it appears that strike activity in advanced industrial societies during the postwar period is not well explained by expectationachievement gap functions of the extrapolative or adaptive variety. The regression results in Table 1 do, however, provide evidence in favor of the "long-run" (polynomial distributed lag) expectation-achievement gap model of(17c).25 Recall that this model asserts that if actual real wage increases over several recent years exceed labor's long-run expectations, then the volume of strikes should decline. The significant negative estimate for the Ei=1 ARt_ lag coefficients clearly supports the long-run expectations hypothesis, and suggests that labor has a "memory" extending many periods back through time in the sense that a change in real wages influences strike activity (negatively or positively) for several subsequent years.26
The level of unemployment (Ut) consistently displays a significant and sizable negative coefficient as hypothesized. This indicates that the strategic considerations outlined earlier govern labor's use of the strike and that strikes should be viewed as tactical weapons in struggles against management and not as poorly timed Simple calculation of strike volume means for each type of bargaining system leaves no doubt that during the postwar period the average level of strike activity covaried with the degree of centralization: mean man-days lost per 1000 wage and salary workers are 425, 172, and 67 for decentralized, centralized, and highly centralized systems, respectively. In this paper, however, interest is focused primarily on the stability of the structural (regression) coefficients of real wages, unemployment, and profits across these diverse systems of industrial relations. Recall that the most successful equation in Table 1 Table 2 reports the estimation results for the respecified long-run expectations model of (19). Clearly, these estimates lend support to the earlier presumption of parameter equivalence across contrasting industrial relations systems. More formally, the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are common across bargaining systems, i.e., Confirmation of the hypothesis requires that movements in money wages have a greater effect on strike activity than movements in prices, that is, the (negative) sum of the lag coefficients for A Wt-, should be significantly larger in absolute value than the corresponding (positive) sum of the APt-1 lag coefficients. Table 3 reveals that if anything, just the reverse is true. The precise form of (26) is unspecified; it is unlikely that a conventional linear formulation will adequately capture the response of strike activity to variations in Communist membership. In particular, a plausible argument can be made that Communist parties cannot effectively mobilize labor discontent and thereby influence industrial conflict appreciably unless membership size (relative to the total work force) reaches a certain "critical mass" or threshold. Increments in CPt above the critical threshold might lead to substantial increases in industrial conflict until an upper bound or "grievance exhaustion" point is reached beyond which further growth in party size has little or no additional effect on strike activity. A nonlinear relationship of this sort is shown in Figure 4 and is given formally by the function (27) SVt= ea-x/CPt.
To recapitulate: Figure 4 and Equation (27) simply articulate the idea that beyond some initial threshold, strike activity moves rapidly upward with increases in Communist party size (the rate of response being greatest at the point of inflection X/2) but then levels off, asymptotically approaching an upper bound or grievance exhaustion level ea.
Combining the political hypotheses of this section with the most successful economic model developed previously yields the following equation for the volume of strikes: 
